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Dissenting opinions are a common feature of multipartite common law and International
tribunals. More often than not they are expressions of disagreement by members of the tribunal
and they seek to convince the majority of the existence of a different logicality. Although they
lack the force of law, dissenting opinions have played a role in the development of law by
informing future generations, furthermore, dissenting opinions allow judges to exercise;
intellectual integrity and judicial independence. The benefits of dissenting opinions in superior
state courts and international adjudicatory bodies are obvious. What is much less obvious are the
benefits of dissenting opinions in arbitration, especially domestic multipartite arbitration. This
research paper proposes that the process of arbitration may actually benefit from dissenting
opinions rendered in multipartite tribunals. Furthermore, this research explores the challenges
posed by dissenting opinions in arbitration.
This research will seek to look at the various statutes and instruments in Kenya and how
dissenting opinions in arbitral awards can be rendered within that framework. It will also move
a step further and look into how other jurisdictions and international arbitration institutions
response to dissenting opinions in arbitral awards.
The research methodology applied in this paper is the review of literature dealing with dissenting
opinions and awards. It will also employ the use of historical analysis and comparative analysis.
As will be revealed by the paper embracing dissenting opinions in multipartite arbitration does
offer potential benefits such as improved awards, maintenance of intellectual integrity and they
have proved beneficial to parties challenging awards and appellate courts. The challenges posed
by dissenting opinions in arbitral awards include an increase in the likelihood that the losing
party will challenge the award, they also risk violating the secrecy of violations and there is the
risk that party appointed arbitrators will misuse them to appease their appointing parties. the
paper will recommend that these risks can be offset by a comprehensive code of ethics and that
dissenting opinion should be expressly provided for.
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Introduction to the Study
1.1.Introduction
Arbitration has been described as a private consensual process where parties in dispute agree to
present their grievances to a third party for settlement.1 Several benefits have been attributed to
arbitration chief of which is that it accords the parties a substantial amount of control over the
proceedings.2 One of the ways in which the parties exercise this control by determining the
composition of the arbitral tribunal.3 Section 12 of the Arbitration Act envisions a tribunal with
either three or two arbitrators, or a sole arbitrator. Where there is tribunal consisting of three
arbitrators, each of the parties shall select an arbitrator and the two arbitrators shall select the
third member of the tribunal. Where the tribunal is made up of two arbitrators, each party shall
select one arbitrator.4 Section 30(1) of the Arbitration Act recognizes majority decisions of the
tribunal; if majority of the tribunal is convinced by a parties argument an award is delivered in
their favour.5 The recognition of a majority’s decisions and not unanimous decisions leaves room
for dissenting opinions by the minority. A dissenting opinion is defined as an opinion in which a
judge (in this case an arbitrator) announces his dissent from the conclusions held by the majority
of the court and expounds his own views.6 Such a separately expressed opinion can differ from
the majority opinion for its reasoning, or reasoning and the conclusion.7 The legislation
governing arbitration in Kenya provides no express exclusion of dissenting opinions by
arbitrators. Although Article 48 of the Investment Disputes Convention Act8 (which is an act
1 Khan F, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’, A paper presented Chartered Institute of Arbitrators-Kenya Branch
Advanced Arbitration Course held on 8-9th March 2007, at Nairobi.
2Muigua K, ‘Emerging Jurisprudence in the Law of Arbitration in Kenya: Challenges and Promises’ available at
http://www.kmco.co.ke/attachments/article/122/Emerging%20Jurisprudence%20in%20the%20Law%20of%20Arbit
ration%20in%20Kenya.pdf, 7 on 23 February 2016.
3 Section11, Arbitration Act (Act No. 4 of 1995).
4 Section 12, Arbitration Act (Act No. 4 of 1995).
5Section 12(1), Arbitration Act (Act No. 4 of1995) states “Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, in arbitral
proceedings with more than one arbitrator, any decision of the arbitral tribunal shall be made by a majority of all its
members.”
6 Black H C and Nolan J R, ‘Black’s Law Dictionary’ 5ed, West Publishing Company, St Paul Minnesota, 1990,385.
7 Peltzer O, ‘Dissenting opinion in arbitration’, Lang, 2000, 17.
8 The Investment Disputes Convention Act (Act No. 31 of 1966).
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enacted to give legal effect to provisions of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States) does recognize the right of the arbitrator
to issue individual opinion to the award, whether he dissents from the majority or not.9
It is undeniable that dissenting opinions in international and domestic courts can contribute to the
development of law but unlike the arbitration tribunals which are not bound by precedent thus it
is less obvious how dissenting opinions could serve any such purpose in arbitration, where the
principle of confidentiality, is usually thought to weigh against publication of awards and
dissenting opinions. 10 What is then the role of dissent in arbitration? Should this be encouraged,
tolerated or altogether prohibited?
By reviewing relevant literature, laws both domestic and international and finally best practices
from other jurisdictions on arbitration. This paper will explore the potential role of dissents in
arbitration. Furthermore, the paper shall investigate the challenges that may be attributed to
dissents in arbitration.
1.2. Background to the problem
Dissenting opinions in domestic courts are common in courts of superior record, especially
tribunals not constituted by one member. Where the tribunals have more than one adjudicator the
principle of majority applies, for example Order 42, rule 30 of the Civil Procedure Act provides
that where the court is composed of more than one judge the decree of the court shall be drawn in
accordance with the conclusions of the majority.11 This leaves the dissent issued without the
force of law and thus they cannot be binding in nature. Arguments have been made that such
dissents do have a role to play in developing the law. Dissenting opinions offer judges a means
of exercising their judicial independence. Former Court of Appeal Justice, Joseph Nyamu
reiterated this fact in Stanbic Bank Kenya Limited v. Kenya Revenue Authority by stating:
“First in my view, dissenting judgments constitute an expression of independence,
freedom of thought and intellect and, second, they may lay the basis for future
9Article 48, The Investment Disputes Convention Act (Act No. 31 of 1966).
10 Mosk R and Ginsburg T, ‘Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration’ Liber amicorum Bengt Broms:
celebrating his 70th birthday, 16 October 1999, Finnish Branch of the International Law Association (1999), 259-
284, 268.
11 Order 42, Rule 30, Civil Procedure Act (Act No. 12 of 2012).
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development of the law. Third, they may provide a firm base for future
generations not to contain themselves in strait jackets, but to always remember
that at the end of the day, that much sought justice might after all not be in the
thunder of the majority judgment, but in the silent breeze of the minority
judgment!” 12
On the importance of dissenting opinions to future generations, Chief Justice Hughes, a former
U.S. Supreme Court Judge stated the following:
“A dissent in a Court of last resort is an appeal . . . to the intelligence of a future
day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting
judge believes the court to have been betrayed.”13
The American Supreme court case of Plessey v Ferguson14 illustrates this notion of “intelligence
of the future.” In the decision, the majority invalidated a federal law entitling “citizens of every
race and colour” to the “full and equal enjoyment” of modes of transportation and places of
public accommodation. Justice Harlan in his dissenting, he wrote,
“There cannot be, in this republic, any class of human beings in practical
subjection to another class.” 15
Justice Harlan’s dissent was a vital component of the decision to desegregate schools in America
in the case of Brown v Board of Education. 16 Justice Scalia commented that such dissenting
opinions “augment rather than diminish the prestige of the Court.”17
He explained: “When history demonstrates that one of the Court’s decisions has
been a truly horrendous mistake, it is comforting . . . to look back and realize that
12 [2009] eKLR.
13Chris Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States, 1936, 68.
14 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
15163 U.S. 537 (1896).
16 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17Scalia A, ‘Dissents’, 13 Organization of American Historians Magazine of History (1998), 19, available at
http://www.oah.org/pubs/magazine/judicial/scalia.html on 23 February 2016.
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at least some of the Justices saw the danger clearly and gave voice, often eloquent
voice, to their concern.”18
In England, such dissents have also contributed to the development of law. Lord Mustill’s
dissenting opinion in SA Chopee-Lavalin NV and Voest-Alpine AG v Ken-Ren Chemicals and
Fertilisers Limited (in liquidation in Kenya) 19illustrates this fact. The contention of the case was
whether or not the court could make orders for security for costs in an International arbitration
held under the International Chamber of commerce arbitration rules. The majority of the Justices
were in consensus that the court possessed the discretionary power to make an order for cost .In
His dissenting opinion Lord Mustill, presented the view that such an order was contrary to the
procedure that the parties had chosen to ensure the protection of their rights and that an
application that was in breach of such party autonomy should be denied.20A year later this
dissenting view was reflected in the English Arbitration Act of 1996.21
In the sphere of international law, the situation becomes more complex. Unlike domestic courts
which are governed by one particular legal system civil law or common law, international courts
and instruments are not bound by one particular legal system. As illustrated in the paragraph
above dissenting opinions in common law have a role to play in developing the law, allow judges
to exercise their judicial independence. In civil law countries, it is quite different, decisions are
usually very short and declaratory of the law rather than explanatory. In countries such as
France, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and most other civil law countries, dissents are prohibited.22
Such a distinction between the two legal systems fails to reflect the reality of international courts
and tribunals which embrace the diversity of the two legal systems in their judicial procedure.23
Article 9 of the International Court of Justice statute codifies this fact as it provides “At every
election, the electors shall bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected should
individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the
18Scalia, ‘Dissents’, 19.
19 [1995] 1 A.C. 38.
20 [1995] 1 A.C. 38.
21Section 61 (2) , Arbitration Act 1996 (United Kingdom), “Unless the parties otherwise agree, the tribunal shall
award costs on the general principle that costs should follow the event except where it appears to the tribunal that in
the circumstances this is not appropriate in relation to the whole or part of the costs.”
22 Kirby M D, ‘Judicial Dissent-Common Law and Civil Law Traditions’, 123 Law Quarterly Monthly (2007), 382-
423, 389.
23 Kirby, ‘Judicial Dissent-Common Law and Civil Law Traditions’, 389.
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representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world
should be assured.” 24 Dissenting opinions as featured in international law reflect this diversity.
Dissenting opinions featured in the decisions of the International Court of Justice have also led to
the development of international law.25 For example in the lotus case26, the Justices of The
permanent Court of International justice were greatly divided which led to the realization that
international law was deficient in nature as concerns extension of national liability to crimes
committed in the high seas which eventually led to the development of law.27 Another example
of the persuasive power that dissents posses is seen in the Norwegian loans case; Judge
Lauterpacht's denounced the “automatic" reservations in the declarations accepting the
International Court's compulsory jurisdiction. This altered the attitudes of governments stopping
the trend of including such reservations in new declarations even resulting in several states
abandoning them from their declarations. 28
The Arbitration Act, 1995 defines arbitration to mean-any arbitration whether or not
administered by a permanent arbitral institution.29 This definition is very nebulous and fails to
capture the essence of arbitration; a more appropriate one would be that arbitration is a private
dispute resolution mechanism where parties in dispute consensually agree to present their
grievances to a neutral third party who will subsequently make a binding decision.30 It is
undeniable that dissenting opinions in international and domestic courts can contribute to the
development of law. However, it is less obvious how dissenting opinions could serve any such
purpose in arbitration where confidentiality of proceeding is essential and there is no formal
system to publish the awards rendered. Furthermore, the review of arbitral decisions is done on
very limited grounds.
24 Article 9, The Statute of The International Court of Justice (1945).
25Anand, ‘The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in International Adjudication’, 14 International And
Comparative Law Quarterly, (1965), 788-808, 802.
26 S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (series A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
27 Anand, The Role Of Individual And Dissenting Opinions In International Adjudication, 725.
28 Certain Norwegian Loans, (France v Norway), (1957) ICJ Rep 9.
29 Section 3, Arbitration Act (Act No. 4 of 1995).
30Khan F, Alternative Dispute Resolution, A paper presented Chartered Institute of Arbitrators-Kenya Branch
Advanced Arbitration Course held on 8-9th March 2007, at Nairobi.
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1.3. Problem Statement
It is undeniable that dissenting opinions in international and domestic courts can contribute to the
development of law. What is less obvious is the potential benefits of dissenting opinions in
arbitration, where the proceedings are predominantly confidential and awards are generally not
published. Furthermore, the review of arbitral decisions is done on very limited grounds.
1.4. Theoretical Framework
The process of arbitration involves; referring an identifiable dispute or controversy between
parties to one or more persons for final decision.31 Arbitration can be divided into two forms, ad
hoc and institutional. Institutional arbitration is arbitration administered by arbitral institution
while ad hoc arbitration is administered by the arbitral tribunal itself.32 The nature of arbitration
has been greatly discussed and two main theories have been elaborated; the contract theory and
the judicial theory.
1.4.1. Contract Theory
The basic assumption of this theory is that the basis of an arbitrator’s power to hear and resolve
disputes is the consent and agreement of the parties.33 This approach posits that unlike courts
arbitral tribunals do not interpret or articulate the law rather they attempt to determine the will of
the parties arising from the corresponding contractual relationship which is the source of the
dispute.34 This theory proposes that the arbitrator’s powers are derived from the legal nexus
between the contracting parties. Therefore, party autonomy is essential in determining both the
substantial and procedural law governing arbitration according to this thesis.
1.4.2. Judicial Theory
The Judicial theory is the opposite of the contract theory. According to the judicial theory,
arbitration is akin to litigation and the purpose of such proceedings is the determination of laws
31 Carlston K S, ‘Theory of the Arbitration Process’, 17 Law and Contemporary Problems, (1952), 631-652, 631.
32 Sammartano M R, ‘International Arbitration: Law and practice’, 1ed, Kluwer Law International, Hague, 2001, 4.
33 Belohlavek A, ‘The legal nature of international Commercial Arbitration and the Effects of Conflict Between
Legal Cultures’, 2, Law Legal Journal of Ukraine, , (2011), 18-30, 18.
34 Belohlavek, ‘The legal nature of international Commercial Arbitration and the Effects of Conflict between Legal
Cultures’, 18.
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after which an authoritative conclusion is arrived at.35 It is based on the idea that arbitration is an
adversarial proceeding similar to litigation and that the arbitrator’s power is donated by the
state.36 This theory does seem to have some foundation since the state retains a regulatory
function with respect to arbitration, for example, their power to enforce awards and appellate
powers in setting aside of awards. Furthermore, this thesis supports the idea that arbitration
tribunals despite their private nature derive their power from the constitution of Kenya 2010 as
with all other dispute resolution mechanisms and therefore are bound by the principles enshrined
within.
1.5. Literature Review
1.5.1. Dissenting opinions in international arbitration
Richard M. Mosk and Tom Ginsburg push forward the argument that dissenting opinions can
improve the legitimacy of international arbitration and thus they do offer significant benefits that
offset the risks posed.37 Noting the prevalence of dissenting opinions in international arbitration
they conclude by saying that they should be addressed in the procedural rules and codes of
ethics.
Veit Öhlberger and Christoph Stippl address several challenges that arise in multipartite arbitral
tribunals internationally and domestically in Austria.38 In the article they the lack of unanimity in
such tribunals may be attributed to disagreement on the outcome or disagreement on the reason
for the outcome.39
Ioan Schiau addresses the issue of the legal fate of dissenting opinions (in terms of usefulness,
effects and procedural aspects), as provided for in various arbitration regulations. He states that
35 Belohlavek, ‘The legal nature of international Commercial Arbitration and the Effects of Conflict between Legal
Cultures’, 19.
36 Belohlavek, ‘The legal nature of international Commercial Arbitration and the Effects of Conflict between Legal
Cultures’, 19.
37 Mosk and Ginsburg, ‘Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration’, 28.
38 Öhlberger V and Stippl C, ‘Rendering of the Award by Multipartite Arbitral Tribunals, How to Overcome Lack
of Unanimity?’, Austrian Arbitration Yearbook 2008, , (2008), 371-399.
39 Öhlberger and Stippl, ‘Rendering of the Award by Multipartite Arbitral Tribunals, How to Overcome Lack of
Unanimity?’ 372.
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there is a requirement for more precise rules regarding the delivery, recording, communication
and effects of dissenting opinions.40
International Chamber of Commerce’s Commission on International Arbitration through the
Working Party on Dissenting Opinions addresses the issue stating that it was it is neither
practical nor desirable to attempt to suppress dissenting opinions in ICC arbitrations. 41
Alan Redfern also addresses the issue stating that dissenting opinions risk breaching the
confidentiality of the tribunal’s deliberations. Furthermore, they also risk undermining the
authority of the tribunal’s award and in the process add little or nothing to the reputation of
international commercial arbitration.42 He does acknowledge that there is a relaxed attitude
towards dissenting opinions in tribunals and by arbitrators.43
1.5.2. Dissent in Investment tribunals
Albert Jan Van Den berg is critical of dissenting opinions in investment tribunals citing empirical
evidence that party-appointed arbitrators are more likely to issue dissenting opinions. This work
is important in evaluating some of the challenges presented by the dissenting opinions by party-
appointed arbitrators44
Catherine Rogers analyses the limitations and potential contributions of empirical research to the
development of investment arbitration. 45 ‘This article analyses the empirical evidence provided
by Albert Jan Van Den Berg in ‘Dissenting opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators’.
Charles Brower and Charles Rosenberg react to a study published in 2009 by Albert Van Den
Berg in which he reported that 100 per cent of the dissenting opinions issued in investment
40 Schiau I, ‘Disagreeing on Parties’ Disagreement: The Arbitral Award and the Dissenting Opinion’, Legal Practice
and International Laws, WSEAS Press, (2011), 141-146, 146.
41Final Report on Dissenting and Separate Opinions of the Working Party on Dissenting Opinions and Interim and
Partial awards of the ICC Commission on International Arbitration, Adopted by the Commission on April 21, 1988.
Available at www.iccdrl.com on 23 February 2016.
42 Redfern A, ‘Dissenting Opinions in International Commercial Arbitration: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 20
Arbitration International, (2004), 223-242, 223.
43 Redfern, Dissenting Opinions in International Commercial Arbitration: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 242.
44 Van den Berg A, ‘Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration’, Looking To the
Future: Essays on International Law in Honour of W. Michael Reisman (2011),821-843, 824.
45 Rogers A C, ‘The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators’, 12 Santa Clara Journal of International Law
223 (2013), 230-262, 230.
9
arbitration have been issued by the arbitrator appointed by the losing party. 46 Albert Van Den
Berg issued a reply to this reaction47 These two are articles are important in shedding light on the
potential roles of dissenting opinions in Investment arbitration tribunals and their limitations.
Shore and Figueroa in their article support the view dissenting opinions do have a role to play in
investment arbitration tribunals. They state that,
“When serving as an arbitrator on an investment treaty tribunal, one
should take a different approach. The development of international investment
law is usually tied to a treaty case. So an arbitrator on that side of the divide must
be prepared to do precisely the opposite – and not bend his or her view to achieve
unanimity. Instead, an arbitrator should state his or her view both to develop the
law…"48
Pedro J. Martinez Fraga and Harout Jack Samra also support this view furthermore, they inspect
the theories of dissent, address the critics of dissent all while examining the potential role that
dissent could play in developing the law.
1.6. Objectives
The objectives of the study are:
1. To assess the potential role of dissenting opinions and awards in arbitration.
2. To analyse the legal framework of arbitration in Kenya focusing on dissenting awards
and opinions.
3. To explore how other jurisdictions deal with dissenting opinions in arbitration.
4. To propose recommendations
1.7. Hypothesis
The following hypothesis will guide this study:
46 Brower C N and Rosenberg C B, ‘The Death Of The Two-headed Nightingale: Why The Paulsson-Van Den Berg
Presumption That Party-Appointed Arbitrators Are Untrustworthy Is Wrongheaded’, 29 Arbitration international
(2013), 7-44, 7.
47 Van den Berg A, ‘Charles Brower's Problem with 100 per cent-Dissenting opinions by party-appointed arbitrators
in investment arbitration’ 31 Arbitration International (2015), 381-391.
48 Shore L and Figueroa K, ‘Dissents, Concurrences and a Necessary Divide Between Investment and Commercial
Arbitration’, 3 Global Arbitration Review (2008), 20-45, 28.
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1. Dissenting opinions do have a potential role in arbitration in Kenya.
1.8. Methodology
The research methodology applied in this paper is the review of literature dealing with dissenting
opinions and awards. It will also employ the use of historical analysis and comparative analysis.
1.8.1. Historical analysis
The history is traced from the formal introduction of arbitration in Kenya to the present. In
tracing the history, the study will use both primary and secondary sources of data. Primary data
include the statutes (both the repealed and new statutes), Constitution of Kenya, Institutional
guidelines, relevant treaties and conventions. Primary sources will be useful to this study as they
outline the legal and institutional framework governing arbitration in Kenya. Secondary sources
include online journal articles, travaux préparatoires, conference papers and textbooks. Scholarly
journals and books will be accessed by visiting various libraries such as the Strathmore
University Library, online access through the Social Sciences Research Network, Journal
Storage (JSTOR), and LexisNexis library among others.
1.8.2. Comparative analysis
This study uses the comparative method by studying what exists in other jurisdictions and
institutions that are member states of similar arbitration conventions with a view of
recommendation of the best practices that can be adopted from these jurisdictions as regards
dissenting opinions and awards.
1.9. Chapter Breakdown
1.9.1. Chapter One
This chapter contains the structure and contents of the research proposal. It states out the
research questions, objectives, hypothesis, literature review, theoretical and conceptual
framework as well as the methodology.
1.9.2. Chapter Two




This chapter explores the best practices from other jurisdictions and institutions.
1.9.4.Chapter Four
This chapter will involve an analysis of the potential advantages and disadvantages of dissents in
arbitration.
1.9.5.Chapter Five
This chapter will present the findings, propose recommendations and conclude the study.
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CHAPTER TWO
Legal Framework of Arbitration in Kenya
2.1. Introduction
Arbitration is a private consensual process where parties in dispute agree to present their
grievances to a third party for a binding decision on the dispute.49 The history of alternative
dispute resolution in Kenya dates back to the pre-colonial days. However, arbitration began with
the coming of colonialists at the end of the 19th century. When the British arrived in Kenya at
the end of the 19th Century they found African customary law, which they regarded as an inferior
form of law. In response to this they imposed the English legal system; such laws are referred to
as the “Received English Laws”.50 These “Received English Laws” operated concurrently with
local customary laws with primacy given to the former in most cases.51 The dawn of arbitration
in Kenya can be traced to the Arbitration Ordinance 1914 which was based on the English
Arbitration Act 1889.52 Kenya has come a long way in terms of arbitration legislation which can
be primarily attributed to globalization, increased complexity of transactions and international
law. To understand arbitration in the proper context, the chapter traces the development of the
legal framework from the colonial era to the current legal framework while illustrating how
dissenting opinions are dealt with within the framework.
2.2. Domestic Legislation
2.2.1. Arbitration Ordinance 1914 (repealed)
This was the first arbitration law in Kenya. The Arbitration Ordinance, 1914 was a
reproduction of the English Arbitration Act, 1889. It was used in resolution of commercial
disputes as an alternative to litigation.53 The principal attribute of this Ordinance is that it
49 Khan F, Alternative Dispute Resolution, A paper presented Chartered Institute of Arbitrators-Kenya Branch
Advanced Arbitration Course held on 8-9th March 2007, at Nairobi.
50 Oboarenegbe P, ‘The Legal Regime of International Commercial Arbitration’, UNPUBLISHED PhD Thesis,
University of Jos, April 2002, 2.
51 Oboarenegbe, ‘The Legal Regime of International Commercial Arbitration’, 2.
52 Gakeri Jacob K., ‘Placing Kenya on the Global Platform: An Evaluation of the Legal Framework on Arbitration
and ADR’, 6 International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, (2011), 219-241,227.
53 Nyutu Agrovet Limited v Airtel Networks Limited [2015] eKLR.
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accorded courts excessive control over the arbitration process in Kenya.54 This judicial control
discouraged locals from embracing arbitration both according to the law and arbitration
conducted according to customary law.55
2.2.2. Arbitration Act 1968 (repealed)
As at the time of political independence in 1964, the 1914 Ordinance was the principle
legislation on arbitration. In 1968, the Arbitration Act, Chapter 49 of the laws of Kenya was
enacted.56 The delay in legislation can be attributed to the fact that England did not modify their
arbitration law until 1950, with the enactment of the English Arbitration Act 1950. The 1968 law
was a reproduction of the English Arbitration Act, 1950.57 The Preamble 58provided that it was
‘An Act of Parliament to make provision in relation to the settlement of differences by
arbitration.’ Since the 1968Act was a carbon copy of the 1950 English Arbitration Act it was
susceptible to similar criticisms, the main one being that the powers of the court were too
extensive.59 The 1968 Act did not provide any specifications on the form or content of the award
but it did provide that where the matter has been referenced to three arbitrators the award of any
two arbitrators is binding.60
2.2.3. Arbitration Act 1995
In 1985 the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) developed
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.61 This law was not
binding but individual states could choose to adopt the law by domesticating it. In Kenya, this
model law was adopted through the 1995 Arbitration Act. The Act, (Act No. 4 of 1995), was
assented to on 10th August 1995 and came to force on 2nd January 1996. The 1995 Act was a
mirror image of the UNCITRAL Model Law except for some provisions in the Act that
54Tugee J, ‘Overview of Arbitration in Kenya’, Available at
<http://www.academia.edu/3057430/Overview_Of_Arbitration_In_Kenya.html>  on 8 June 2016
55 Mutuku P, ‘International Commercial Arbitration in Kenya: Is Arbitration a Viable Alternative In Resolving
Commercial Disputes In Kenya?’ UNPUBLISHED LLM, University of Cape Town, 13th February 2014.
56 Arbitration Act, chapter 49 of the laws of Kenya, now repealed.
57Muigua K, ‘Emerging Jurisprudence in the Law of Arbitration in Kenya: Challenges and Promises’, 8.
58 Section 2, Arbitration Act, chapter 49 of the laws of Kenya.
59 Muigua K, ‘Emerging Jurisprudence in the Law of Arbitration in Kenya: Challenges and Promises’, 8.
60 Section 11(2), Arbitration Act 1968 (repealed).
61 14UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, (United Nations Document A/40/17, Annex
17), as adopted by the United Nations Commission on trade and law on June 21, 1985.
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domesticated the New York Convention.62 It applied to both domestic and international
arbitration.63 In 2009, the Arbitration Act, 1995 was amended.64 One of the reasons the
amendments were made was to accommodate the amendments made to the UNCITRAL Model
Law in 2006.65 The constant evolution of international commercial arbitration practice warranted
these amendments. To supplement the substantive provisions of the Arbitration Act, procedural
rules, The Arbitration rules 1997, were enacted in accordance with section 40 66 of the
Arbitration Act.
A dissenting opinion is a discoursive address that differs from the reasoning and conclusions
expressed by the other members of the tribunal.67 It can be considered a reactionary expression
attempting to persuade the rest of the existence of a different legitimacy or logicality.68 The
Arbitration Act does not provide any express recognition for dissenting opinions but section 30
(1) of the Act provides that only the decision of the majority is recognised.69 This means that an
award is presented in favour of the party that convinces the majority of the tribunal. The lack of
legal status and recognition in the substantive Act may point to either their illegitimacy or
perceived lack of importance. Section 31 (2) states that the signatures of the majority of the panel
are sufficient and that the reasons for an omitted signature should be given, thus we may
conclude that the dissenter should not sign the award. The UK Act of 1996 provides that the
parties may agree on the form of an award.70 If no such agreement exists, the award should be
made in writing and signed by all the arbitrators or all those assenting to the award.71 Therefore,
62 Gakeri K., ‘Placing Kenya on the Global Platform: An Evaluation of the Legal Framework on Arbitration and
ADR’, 230.
63 Section 2, Arbitration Act (Act No. 4 of 1995).
64 Arbitration (Amendment) Act, 2009, laws of Kenya.
65 Amendments to articles 1 (2), 7, and 35 (2), a new chapter IV A to replace article 17 and a new article 2 A were
adopted by UNCITRAL on 7 July 2006.
66 Section 40(1), Arbitration Act (Act No. 4 of1995) “The Chief Justice may make rules of Court for—
a) the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and all proceedings consequent thereon or incidental
thereto;
b) the filing of applications for setting aside arbitral awards;
c) the staying of any suit or proceedings instituted in contravention of an arbitration agreement;
d) Generally all proceedings in court under this Act.”
67 Bhatia V, Candlin C and Gotti M, Discourse and practice in international commercial arbitration: Issues,
Challenges and Prospects, Ashgate publishing Ltd, Furnham, 2012,114.
68Bhatia V, Candlin C and Gotti M, Discourse and practice in international commercial arbitration: Issues,
Challenges and Prospects, 114.
69 Section 30(1), Arbitration Act (Act No. 4 of1995).
70 Section 52(3), Arbitration Act 1996 (United Kingdom).
71 Section 52(4), Arbitration Act 1996 (United Kingdom).
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dissenting arbitrators have no obligation to sign the award. Under English law, dissenting
opinions do not have to be included in the award and their inclusion is to be decided by the
arbitrators in the majority.72 They are, however, provided to the parties as a matter of practice.73
2.2.4. Institutional rules (Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Kenya Branch rules)
The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Kenya Branch was established in 1984. It is one the
branches of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, which was founded in 1915 with headquarters
in London.74 The Chartered institute of arbitrators issued a set of rules in accordance with the
provisions of the Arbitration (amendment) Act, 2009 which are applicable to arbitration taking
place within the jurisdiction of the Republic of Kenya.75 Parties to a contract who wish to have a
dispute subject to the arbitration rules are recommended to insert in the arbitration clause the
words “…Shall be referred to arbitration under the rules of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators
(Kenya Branch).”76
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Kenya Branch rules do not have any particular provisions on
dissenting opinions, although it does provide that reason upon which the award is based should
be given if the parties have agreed.77 The reasons contained in an award demonstrate the basis on
which the tribunal reached its decision and it has been argued it increases the likelihood that the
parties will voluntarily abide by the decision.78
2.2.5. Constitution of Kenya, 2010
In 2010, Kenya conducted a Referendum and a new Constitution was promulgated. The
constitution of Kenya, 2010 accords alternative dispute resolution mechanisms a great deal of
support. Article 159 of the constitution provides that the promotion of Alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms is a principle that should guide the judiciary in exercise of their judicial
72Cargill International S.A. Antigua and Another  v. Sociedad Iberica De Molturacion S.A. And Others
[1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 489.
73Lew J, Mistelis L and Kröll S, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, The
Hague, 2003, 642.
74 http://www.ciarbkenya.org/about.html on 20th June 2016.
75 Arbitration Rules, Chartered institute of arbitrators (Kenya Branch)
76 2nd Note , Arbitration Rules, Chartered institute of arbitrators (Kenya Branch).
77 Rule 11(5), Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (Kenya Branch) Arbitration rules
78Turner P and Mohtashami R, A Guide to The LCIA Arbitration Rules, 1ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009,
115.
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authority.79 Recognition of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is particularly important in
fulfilling Article 4880 which guarantees access to justice. Further, by taking such a position the
constitution ensures that the courts do not have a monopoly on dispute resolution in Kenya.81
2.3. International Framework
2.3.1. New York Convention
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, also known as
the "New York Convention", is one of the key instruments in international arbitration. The
Convention entered into force on 7 June 195982 The Convention's principal objective of the
convention is to ensure that foreign arbitral awards will not be prejudiced against and it obliges
Parties to ensure such awards are recognized and generally capable of enforcement in their
jurisdiction.83 Kenya acceded to the New York Convention the10th of February 1989. The
provisions of this convention were domesticated by section 36 (2) of the Arbitration Act 1968.84
2.3.2. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between states and
nationals of other states (ICSID convention)
The ICSID Convention is a multilateral treaty formulated by the Executive Directors of
the World Bank.85 The ICSID Convention entered into force on October 14, 1966. Kenya signed
the convention on 24th May 1966. The convention was domesticated by the Investment Disputes
Convention Act86 The investment disputes tribunal Act expressly recognizes the rights of
arbitrator to issue individual opinion and in particular a dissenting opinion: “Any member of the
79 Article 159 (2) (c), Constitution of Kenya (2010) ‘alternative forms of dispute resolution including reconciliation,
mediation, arbitration and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms shall be promoted, subject to clause.’
80 Article 48, Constitution of Kenya, (2010) ‘The State shall ensure access to justice for all persons and, if any fee is
required, it shall be reasonable and shall not impede access to justice.’
81 Mutuku P, ‘International Commercial Arbitration in Kenya: Is Arbitration a Viable Alternative In Resolving
Commercial Disputes In Kenya?’, 23.
82 Article VII, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Adopted 7 June 1959 ,
‘The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect the validity of multilateral or bilateral agreements
concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by the Contracting States nor deprive
any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent
allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon.’
83 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html on 20th June 2016.
84 Section 36 (2), Arbitration Act 1968 (repealed)
85 https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/Pages/default.aspx on 20 June 2016
86 The Investment Disputes Convention Act (Act No. 31 of 1966).
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Tribunal may attach his individual opinion to the award, whether he dissents from the majority or
not, or a statement of his dissent.”87
2.3.3. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration was adopted by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on 21st June 1985. The
Model Law is designed to assist States in reforming and modernizing their laws on arbitral
procedure so as to take into account the particular features and needs of international commercial
arbitration.88 The model law was not binding but parties could domesticate the act by enacting a
replica of the model law as Kenya did in 1995 with the Arbitration Act 1995.
The model law has no specific provision for dissenting opinions but under Article 31, a
dissenting arbitrator may withhold their signature. The issue on the omission of signatures was
discussed in the 328th meeting of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on
the drafting of the model law on international commercial Arbitration.89 Mr Lavina, from the
Philippines, had suggested that the provision on the omission of signature in Article 31 be
deleted from the text, questioning the effect it would have on enforcement if the reasons for
omission were not given.90 In reply, the Chairman (Mr Loewe from Austria), stated that the
position was a compromise between the fact that arbitrators were free to make any decision as
regards the matters before them and that arbitrators were obliged to sign the award. During the
drafting of the Model Law (on which the Arbitration Act is based), the issue on dissenting
opinions under Article 31 was also raised by the Secretariat and they noted there are those who,
based on their legal systems and practice who wanted a specific provision on dissenting opinions
and awards.91 The Secretariat, suggested that the Commission should look into whether the
provision on omission of signatures should be retained as is and whether the model law should
87 Article 48, The Investment Disputes Convention Act (Act No. 31 of 1966).
88 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration.html on 20th June 2016
89Summary meetings on the UCITRAL model law on International Commercial Arbitration , Yearbook of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law Volume XVI (1985), 328th meeting, Tuesday, 18 June 1985 ,
A/CN.9/246 Article 31 (1), para 25.
90 Summary meetings on the UCITRAL model law on International Commercial Arbitration, Article 31 (1), para. 25.
91 Summary meetings on the UCITRAL model law on International Commercial Arbitration, Article 31 (1), para. 26.
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take a stand on dissenting opinions i.e. whether they should be explicitly recognized or expressly
prohibited.92 The Commission took no action.93
2.4. Conclusion
This chapter clearly reveals that within the legal framework there is room for presenting
dissenting awards. The Arbitration Act 199594 and the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Kenya
Branch rules95 provide that an arbitrator may omit his signature from the award which has to be
justified. During the deliberations of this clause in the UNICITRAL model law it was considered
a compromise between an arbitrators obligation to sign an award and their freedom to make any
decision appropriate to the matter.96 Within the local framework only the the Investment
Disputes Convention Act expressly recognizes the right of an arbitrator to dissent.97 What is
noteworthy is that the substantive statues give no clear form or procedure for presenting
dissenting awards in multipartite arbitral tribunals. This may point to a reluctance to expressly
recognize them or a deliberate suppression.
92 Report of the Secretary-General, Analytical commentary on draft text of a model law on international
Commercial arbitration, A/CN.9/264, Article 31, para. 2.
93United Nations Conference on Trade and  Development, Dispute Settlement: International Commercial
Arbitration, Making the Award and Termination of Proceedings, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.41, 20
94 Section 30(1), Arbitration Act (Act No. 4 of1995).
95 Rule 11(5),  Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (Kenya Branch) Arbitration rules.
96 Summary meetings on the UCITRAL model law on International Commercial Arbitration, Article 31 (1), and
para. 25.
97 Article 48, The Investment Disputes Convention Act (Act No. 31 of 1966).
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CHAPTER THREE
A Comparative study on Dissenting Opinions in Arbitral Awards
3.1Introduction
This chapter explores how other jurisdictions and international arbitral institutions deal with
dissenting opinions in arbitral awards. The jurisdictions to be considered are England and
Switzerland. These jurisdictions are chosen since their state courts have made significant
comments on the legal status of dissenting opinions.  The international arbitral institutions that
shall be considered are the International Chamber for Commerce (ICC) and Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between states and nationals of other states tribunal.
3.2Dissenting Opinions in English Arbitration Law
Arbitration in England is regulated by the Arbitration Act 1996 (English Arbitration Act).98 It
came into force on 31 January 1997. The English Arbitration act is considered progressive99
since it brought English arbitral law in line with internationally recognised principles of
arbitration law, is intended to be user-friendly; it has a logical structure and is written in plain
English, it limits judicial intervention and increases the scope of party autonomy.100 Like most
modern arbitration Acts it is broadly-based on the Model Law (1985) which applies to both
domestic and international arbitration.101 Arbitration in England can also be conducted under the
LCIA (formerly known as the London Court of International Arbitration) which is a renowned
international arbitration institution with popular rules, which will also acts as an appointing and
administrative authority in respect of arbitrations under its own Rules or the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law Rules.
Dissenting opinions are not expressly mentioned in either the Arbitration Act 1996 or the LCIA
Arbitration Rules. In the spirit of party autonomy the Arbitration Act allows the parties to agree
98 Preamble, Arbitration Act 1996 (United Kingdom), “An Act to restate and improve the law relating to arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration agreement; to make other provision relating to arbitration and arbitration awards; and for
connected purposes.”
99 Muigua K, ‘The Arbitration Acts: A Review Of Arbitration Act, 1995 Of Kenya Vis-A-Viz Arbitration Act 1996
Of United Kingdom’, lecture on Arbitration Act, 1995 and Arbitration Act 1996 of UK delivered at the Chartered
Institute of Arbitrators-Kenya Branch Entry Course held at College of Insurance on 25-26th August 2008 (Revised
on 2nd March 2010), on 6 January 2016, 2.
100 Guy P and Bridge D, 'Arbitration in England and Wales' 1 CMS Guide to Arbitration, (2012),297-327,299.
101 Guy P and Bridge D, 'Arbitration in England and Wales', 299.
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on the form and contents of the award, if they fail to agree the default rules apply.102 The
Arbitration Act default rule require that the award must be in writing and signed by all the
arbitrators or all those assenting to the award.103 It must contain the reasons for the award, the
seat of the arbitration and the date that the award was made.104 Therefore, if an arbitrator wishes
to dissent from the award they need only to abstain from signing the award. The LCIA rules
provide that where there are three arbitrators the decision of the majority is sufficient.105 Under
the LCIA Rules if an arbitrator fails or refuses to sign the award, the signature of the majority is
sufficient provided that reasons for the admission are provided.106
The foremost English authority of how dissenting opinions should be treated is the case of
Cargill International S.A. Antigua and Another v. Sociedad Iberica De Molturacion S.A. and
Others107 In this case the Court of Appeal had to decide whether a dissenting arbitrator in
GAFTA arbitration (under the Grain and Feed Trade Association Rules) could insist on his
dissent being included in the award. On its proper construction, Rule 7.1 of the GAFTA Rules,
required that 'all awards of arbitration shall be in writing on an official form issued by the
Association and shall be signed by all members of the tribunal', meant that only reasons in favour
of an award had to be stated and that it had to be signed by all three arbitrators including the
dissenter. The dissenting arbitrator had refused to sign because he was not allowed to express his
own dissenting reasons in the award which resulted in his replacement. When rendering his
decision in the case, Waller J quoted Bingham J’s decision in Stinnes Interoil GmbH v
Halcoussis & Co.108Bingham J stated as follows,
"The dissenting opinion has of course no value so far as findings of fact are
concerned, the relevant findings being those of the majority. The dissenting
opinion is no more than at best persuasive so far as questions of law are
concerned. I nonetheless formed the view that it would be unreasonably
formalistic for the Court to decline to look at a document which the tribunal
102 Section 52(1), Arbitration Act 1996 (United Kingdom).
103 Section 52(3), Arbitration Act 1996 (United Kingdom).
104 Section 52(3), Arbitration Act 1996 (United Kingdom).
105 Article 26.3, LCIA Arbitration rules 2012.
106 Article 26.3, LCIA Arbitration rules 2012.
107 [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 489.
108 [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep 44.
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clearly intended that the Court should see. I should, however, emphasise that the
existence and content of this dissenting opinion cannot alter the fundamental task
of the Court, whatever that may be in respect of any particular summons."
Based on Judge Bingham’s interpretation, Lord Justice Waller came to the conclusion that a
dissenting opinion is not formally part of the award but the reasons of the dissenting arbitrator
are published as a matter of courtesy to that dissenting member and perhaps as a matter of
courtesy to the parties.109 As to whether the courtesy should normally be extended to an
arbitrator who dissents, Waller J stated it would depend on the type and circumstances of the
arbitration.110 He did note that the courtesy was often extended since dissenting opinions are a
natural response by one of the arbitrators to resolve the dispute juridically, furthermore they
could be of use to the losing party and the appellate tribunal.111 To summarise dissenting
arbitrators cannot insist on the inclusion of their reasons into the award, rather their reasons
should be annexed to the award out of professional courtesy.
3.3Dissenting Opinions in Swiss Arbitration Law
Arbitration in Switzerland is regulated by either; Chapter 12 of the Federal Private International
Law Act (hereinafter referred to as PIL Act) or Part 3 of the Swiss Civil Procedure code. Chapter
12 of the PIL Act applies to any arbitration where the seat of the arbitral tribunal is in
Switzerland or if before the arbitration agreement is concluded at least one of the parties was not
domiciled in or had habitual residence in Switzerland.112 Chapter 12 PIL Act is not based on the
UNCITRAL Model Law since it was drafted before the model law was adopted that
notwithstanding there are no fundamental differences between Chapter 12 and the Model Law.113
Part 3 of the Swiss Civil Procedure code applies to any arbitration based Switzerland, unless the
provisions of the Twelfth Chapter of the PIL Act apply.114
109 [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 489 at 496.
110 [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 489 at 496.
111 [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 489 at 497.
112 Article 176(1), Chapter 12, Federal Private International Law Act, “The provisions of this chapter shall apply to
all arbitrations if the seat of the arbitral tribunal is in Switzerland and if, at the time of the conclusion of the
arbitration agreement, at least one of the parties had neither its domicile nor its habitual residence in Switzerland.”
113Ritter D, Brown-Berset D and Vallée-Grisel D, ‘Arbitration in
Switzerland’,http://globalarbitrationreview.com/jurisdiction/1000208/Switzerland, on 8 January 2017.
114 Article 353 (1), Part 3, Swiss Civil Procedure code, ‘The provisions of this Part apply to the proceedings before
arbitral tribunals based in Switzerland, unless the provisions of the Twelfth Chapter of the IPLA apply.’
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Both Chapter 12 of the PIL Act and Part 3 of the Swiss Civil Procedure code do not expressly
provide for dissenting opinions. Under Chapter 12 of the PIL Act115 and Part 3 of the Swiss Civil
Procedure code116 only the decision of majority of the tribunal is recognized. In the absence of a
majority, the signature of the chairperson shall suffice.117 The result of these provisions is that
dissenting arbitrators are free to dissent but the statutes give no guidance on their form or
admissibility. According to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, dissenting opinions are separate from the
award and therefore do not affect the reasons on which the award is based.118 Even though it is
communicated to the parties, the dissenting opinion remains independent and extraneous to the
award.119 Where the parties to the proceedings have not excluded dissenting opinion, the
decision to append a dissenting opinion lies with the majority of members of the tribunal.120
3.4Dissenting Opinions under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between states and nationals of other states (ICSID convention)
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States was formulated by the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development. As of May 2016, 153 countries had ratified the Convention to become
Contracting States.121 The ICSID Convention, facilities conciliation and arbitration of investment
disputes between contracting states and nationals of other contracting states. The jurisdiction of
ICSID is elaborated in Article 25(1) of the Convention.122 The provisions of the Convention are
complemented by the Rules of Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration
115 Article 189, Federal Private International Law Act.
1. The arbitral award shall be rendered in conformity with the rules of procedure and in the form agreed upon
by the parties.
2. In the absence of such an agreement, the arbitral award shall be made by a majority, or, in the absence of a
majority, by the president alone. The award shall be in writing, supported by reasons, dated and signed. The
signature of the president is sufficient.
116 Article 384 (1), Part 3, Swiss Civil Procedure code.
117 Article 384 (1), Part 3, Swiss Civil Procedure code.
118 Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, Judgment of 25 May 1992, 4P.23/1991 at 2b.
119 Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, Judgment of 18 March 2010, 4A_584/2009.
120 Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, Judgment of 25 May 1992, 4P.23/1991 at 2b.
121 Database of ICSID Member States, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member States.aspx.,
On 8 January 2017.
122 Article 25(1), Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between states and nationals of other
states(Washington Convention),14 October 1966, 575 UNTS 159 “The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or
agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State,
which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their
consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.”
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Proceedings (Institution Rules); Rules of Procedure for Conciliation Proceedings (Conciliation
Rules); and Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules).
Unlike other current commercial arbitration rules such as; the ICC arbitration rules, LCIA rules,
World Intellectual Property Organisation rules and UNCITRAL arbitral rules that neither
encouraged nor prohibit dissenting opinions, the arbitral rules for the ICSID Convention
expressly recognise the right of an arbitrator to issue a dissenting opinion. This right is
elaborated in Article 48(4)123 of the convention and Article 52(3)124 of the ICSID Arbitration
(Additional Facility) Rules. Under the convention the dissenting arbitrator is free to render
detailed opinions that address every question before the tribunal or focus on specific points of the
majority’s argument.125
An informal system of precedent has developed within investment arbitration.126 Even though
arbitrators are not bound by prior published awards they are obliged to take them into account in
order to stabilize investment arbitration and contribute to the harmonious development of
investment law127 Due to this informal system of precedence dissenting opinions have a greater
role in investment arbitration and seem to seem to have an influence on the development of
international investment law.128 For example, in the case Helnan International Hotels A/S v Arab
Republic of Egypt129 to justify its ruling130 the tribunal referred to a passage in the dissenting
opinion in Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v Philippines.131
123 Article 48(4),Washington Convention, “Any member of the Tribunal may attach his individual opinion to the
Award, whether he dissents from the majority or not, or a statement of his dissent’’
124 Article 52(3), ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, “The award shall be signed by the members of the
Tribunal who voted for it; the date of each signature shall be indicated. Any member of the Tribunal may attach his
individual opinion to the award, whether he dissents from the majority or not, or a statement of his dissent.”
125 Schreuer C and Schreuer C, The ICSID Convention, Cambridge University Press 2009,833.
126 Weidemaier M, ‘Toward of Theory of Precedent in Arbitration’, 51 William & Mary Law Review, (2010), 1895-
1959, 1895.
127 Cheng T, ‘Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration’, 30 Fordham International Law Journal,
(2006), 1014-1039, 1016.
128 Redfern A and Hunter M, International Arbitration, 2ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, 187.
129 ICSID Case No. 05/19, 125, (July 3, 2008).
130 ICSID Case No. 05/19, 125, (July 3, 2008) (Decision on Award)“An international tribunal must accept the res
judicata effect of a decision made by a national court within the legal order where it belongs.”
131 ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, (Aug. 16, 2007) (Award).
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3.5 Dissenting Opinions under the International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration
Rules
Arbitration under the International Chamber of Commerce is conducted under the International
Chamber of Commerce rules and administered by the International Court of Arbitration.
Arbitration under the ICC Arbitration Rules is a formal procedure leading to a binding decision
from a neutral arbitral tribunal, susceptible to enforcement pursuant to both domestic arbitration
laws and international treaties such as the 1958 New York Convention. The Court does not
resolve disputes itself rather it administers the resolution of disputes by arbitral tribunals.132
The issue on dissenting opinion in international arbitration was addressed by the International
Chamber of Commerce’s Commission on International Arbitration through the Working Party on
Dissenting Opinions.133 The first Interim Report of the Working Party, dated 1 October 1986,
stated the following on dissenting opinions;
“It was agreed that it is neither practical nor desirable to attempt to suppress
dissenting opinions in ICC arbitrations. A minority opinion was expressed to the
effect that the ICC should seek to minimise the role of dissenting opinions, but the
prevailing view was that the ICC should neither encourage nor discourage the
giving of such opinions.”134
The commission suggested that focus should be extended to regulation of the practices of the
Court of Arbitration and the Secretariat rather than providing expressly on dissenting opinions.135
Under the ICC rules, only the decision of the majority is recognised and if there is no majority
132 Article 1(2), International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration rules.
133 Final Report on Dissenting and Separate Opinions of the Working Party on Dissenting Opinions and Interim and




0Opinions&LOC=19 on 17 September 2016
134 Final Report on Dissenting and Separate Opinions of the Working Party on Dissenting Opinions and Interim and
Partial Awards of the ICC Commission on International Arbitration.
135 Final Report on Dissenting and Separate Opinions of the Working Party on Dissenting Opinions and Interim and
Partial Awards of the ICC Commission on International Arbitration. “It was agreed that it is not necessary or
desirable to introduce any new article relating to dissenting opinions into the ICC Rules of Arbitration. It was
considered that the existing problems currently facing the Court of Arbitration in relation to dissenting opinions
could be best handled by the creation of guidelines for the Court of Arbitration and the Secretariat; it may be
desirable to introduce new Internal Rules in due course, but without urgency.”
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the chairperson decision would suffice.136 In practice under ICC arbitration, the dissenting
arbitrator submits their opinion to the other arbitrators and to the ICC court.137 The ICC Court of
Arbitration has sometimes insisted on a short summary indicating how many of the arbitrators
agreed with the decision, instead of long detailed opinions and in some cases has struck out
opinions that appear to violate the principle of confidentiality of deliberations.138
3.6 Conclusion
In the jurisdictions analysed in this chapter; England and Switzerland, neither of their domestic
statutes expressly recognise dissenting opinions. In both jurisdictions decisions in multipartite
arbitral tribunals are made by the majority.  From the precedent generated by state courts in both
countries it is apparent that dissenting opinions are not formally part of the award and that their
inclusion into the award depends on the decision of the majority or the agreement of the parties
to the arbitration. The ICC Arbitration Rules also require a majority decision.139 Within ICC
arbitration both the award of the tribunal and the dissenting opinion are submitted to the
International Court of Arbitration for scrutiny before they are issued to the parties. When offered
a chance to comment on dissenting opinions in ICC arbitration, the working Party on Dissenting
Opinions and Interim and Partial Awards, took the ambivalent route ruling that they could
neither encourage nor discourage the giving of such opinions. Unlike the statutes of the
jurisdictions analysed within this chapter and the ICC rules, the ICSID Convention is the only
that expressly provides for an arbitrators right to dissent. An arbitrator may exercise this right
either by rendering an opinion on the issues raised by the parties or by addressing specific
arguments made by the majority of the tribunal.
136 Article 31, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration rules, “When the arbitral tribunal is composed of
more than one arbitrator, an award is made by a majority decision. If there is no majority, the award shall be made
by the president of the arbitral tribunal alone.”
137 Schäfer E, Verbist H and Imhoos C, ICC Arbitration in Practice, 1ed, Kluwer Law International, The Hague
2005, 120.
138 Donovan  F P, ‘Dissenting Opinions’, 7 ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, (1996), 76-101, 77.
139 Article 31, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration rules, “When the arbitral tribunal is composed of
more than one arbitrator, an award is made by a majority decision. If there is no majority, the award shall be made
by the president of the arbitral tribunal alone.”
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CHAPTER FOUR
Potential Benefits and Challenges of Dissenting Opinions in Domestic
Arbitration
4.1 Introduction
In common law countries, dissenting opinions are a normal part of the litigation process in
superior courts.140 It is accepted that all judges cannot be of the same opinion in adjudication
especially in complex trials and the openness of the administration of justice demands the
publication of the dissenting opinions.141 These dissenting opinions are often herald as a voice of
the future.142 Former Court of Appeal Judge, Joseph Nyamu on dissenting opinions stated that:
“First in my view, dissenting judgments constitute an expression of independence,
freedom of thought and intellect and, second, they may lay the basis for future
development of the law. Third, they may provide a firm base for future
generations not to contain themselves in strait jackets, but to always remember
that at the end of the day, that much sought justice might after all not be in the
thunder of the majority judgment, but in the silent breeze of the minority
judgment!” 143
The role played by dissenting opinions in the development of law within domestic courts is
undeniable. The benefits that could accrue from dissenting opinions in arbitration are not as
obvious considering that there no system of precedent in arbitration and the proceedings are
often confidential. Furthermore the review of arbitral decisions is done on very limited grounds.
This chapter seeks to highlight potential benefits that may accrue from dissenting opinions in
domestic arbitration. This chapter will also analyse the challenges posed by dissenting opinions
in arbitration which might explain the reluctance to expressly recognise them within the law.
140Laffranque J, ‘Dissenting Opinion and Judicial Independence’, 8 Juridical International, (2003), 162-172,164.
141Laffranque J, ‘Dissenting Opinion and Judicial Independence’, 164.
142 L'Heureux-Dube C, ‘The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?’ 38 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, (2000), 496-
516,504.
143 Stanbic Bank Kenya Limited v. Kenya Revenue Authority [2009] eKLR.
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4.2 Potential Benefits of Dissenting Opinions
4.2.1 Dissenting opinions can produce better awards
Section 32 (3) of the Arbitration Act of 1995 provides that the arbitral award shall state the
reasons upon which it is based unless the Parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given.
Similarly, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Kenya Branch rules provide that reasons upon
which the award is based should be given if the parties have agreed.144 Article 48 of the
Investment Disputes Convention Act also provides that the award shall state the reasons upon
which it is based. Where parties have agreed on reasoned awards in multipartite arbitral
tribunals, dissenting opinions may improve the quality of the reasoning in the final award
provided that the majority receives the dissenting opinion before the award is finalized.145 First,
the dissenting opinion can help ensure the majority has properly addressed all the issues before
them.146 Second, dissents seek to persuade the majority of a different logicality and legitimacy,
dissenting opinions may improve the quality of the reasoning in the final award since the
majority will be inclined to rebut the reasons given by the dissenting arbitrator and to show why
they did not justify a different outcome of the decision on the merits.147 A well authored dissent
helps the majority refine and clarify their initial propositions.148 Third, on producing better
awards, Dissenting opinions may increase the accountability of the individual decision maker for
every individual aspect of the decision.149 As a prominent United States Supreme Court Justice
said, dissent "safeguards the integrity of the judicial decision-making process by keeping the
majority accountable for the rationale and consequences of its decision.”150
Well-reasoned awards ensure quality resolution of the present dispute and may improve
enforceability.151 The X and Y v Z case in the Swiss Federal Supreme Court demonstrates this
fact. In this 2006 case, a partial award rendered by an ICC tribunal seated in Zurich was
144 Rule 11(5), Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (Kenya Branch) Arbitration rules.
145 Schroeder H and Pfitzner T, ‘Recent Trends Regarding Dissenting Opinions In International Commercial
Arbitration’, Year Book on International Arbitration, 2 (2012), 133-149,137.
146 Mosk and Ginsburg, ‘Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration’, 30.
147 Öhlberger and Stippl, ‘Rendering of the Award by Multipartite Arbitral Tribunals, How to Overcome Lack of
Unanimity?’ 371.
148Ginsburg R B, ‘The Role of Dissenting Opinions’, Presentation to the Harvard Club of Washington, D.C, on
December 17, 2009, 3.
149Smit H, ‘Dissenting Opinions in Arbitration’, 15 ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, (2004), 1-37,
37.
150 W J Brennan, "In Defense of Dissents", 37 Hastings Law Journal (1986), 427.
151 Mosk and Ginsburg, ‘Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration’, 371.
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challenged on liability in principle.152 The challenging parties claimed that their right to be heard
had been violated by the majority of the tribunal since they purportedly ignored the contents of a
witness statement. The challenge was dismissed by the court, stating that the mere fact that a
document was not mentioned in the reasoning of the award did not justify the conclusion that the
document had been disregarded by the tribunal. To support this argument the court noted that the
witness statement had actually been mentioned by the dissenting arbitrator leading them to
conclude that the statement had been considered by the tribunal during deliberations. This case
illustrates a situation where the contents of the dissenting opinion led to the dismissal of the
challenge by convincing the judge that all the issues had been adequately been considered which
had the effect of improving the award’s enforcement.
4.2.2 Intellectual Integrity and the conscience or duty of the Arbitrator
Dissenting opinions can allow arbitrators to preserve intellectual integrity and to allow them to
act in accordance with their conscience.153 If multipartite tribunals were bound to strict rules of
unanimity arbitrators would be compelled to conform to the majority even where there are
fundamental conscientious indifferences. Dissenting opinions offer arbitrators an opportunity to
preserve their intellectual honesty and their legal and professional conscience. Furthermore, the
constitution of Kenya provides for freedom of conscience, thought, belief and opinion and
issuing a dissent in accordance with the facts and the law could be considered an exercise of this
right154
Arbitrators have a professional and ethical duty to inform the parties of their legal opinion and
the arguments that prevented them from accepting the arbitral award.155 Such intellectual
independence is important for an arbitrator to maintain his professional reputation and integrity.
It should be noted that arbitrators who issue dissents should do so in a manner that preserves the
152 Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, decision of 19 June 2006, 4P.74/2006, ASA Bulletin, 24 (2006) 4, 761.
153 Kwast J.P, ‘Prohibitions of dissenting Opinions in international Arbitration’, What's Wrong With International
Law: Liber amicorum A.H.A Soons, Brill Nijhoff, (2015), 128-154, 133.
154 Article 32(1), Constitution of Kenya (2010), “Every person has the right to freedom of conscience, religion,
thought, belief and opinion.”
155 Mytilineos Holdings SA v. The State Union of Serbia & Montenegro and Republic of Serbia (I), Permanent Court
of Arbitration, Dissenting Opinion by Dobrosav Mitrović (Partial Award on Jurisdiction), 8 September 2006.
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integrity of the process of arbitration, namely in a manner that does not jeopardize enforcement
and recognition of the award.
4.2.3 Dissenting Opinions and Challenging awards
Arbitration awards have been subject to some form of judicial review for as long as arbitration
has been an alternative means of dispute resolution.156 The Arbitration Act of Kenya prescribes
limited scope for the courts in Kenya to set aside an arbitral award. An arbitral award may only
be set aside if one or more of the following grounds are proved, namely:
a) Incapacity of a party;
b) Invalidity of an agreement;
c) Insufficient notice of appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings;
d) Where an arbitrator exceeds the scope of his or her reference;
e) Where an award is induced or influenced by fraud or corruption;
f) Where the dispute is not capable of being resolved by arbitration; or
g) Where the arbitral award is against public policy.157
It must be emphasized that a dissenting arbitrator must never dissent for the purpose of
frustrating the recognition or enforcement of an award but a dissenting opinion may be beneficial
to parties seeking judicial review of arbitral awards considering how limited the scope for review
is. Another ground under which an award may be set aside is where there is an apparent error in
law or of fact. Kenyan courts will not set aside an arbitral award even if it is shown to be affected
by an error of fact or an error of law unless the error of law is manifest on the face of the
record.158 Jurisprudence from the United Kingdom and a recent Kenyan case has suggested that
parties and the courts could rely on dissenting opinions when challenges on such grounds are
brought forward.
The first of these cases is CGU v AstraZeneca.159 The Court of Appeal was seized with an
application for leave to appeal against an English arbitral award under Section 69160 (appeal on a
156 Van den Berg, A, 'Should the Setting Aside of the Arbitral Award Be Abolished?' 29 ICSID Review, 263-288,
(2014), 265.
157 Section 35(2), Arbitration Act (Act No. 4 of1995).
158 Kenya Oil Company Limited & Anor v. Kenya Pipeline Company Limited [2014 eKLR].
159 CGU v AstraZeneca [2006] EWCA 1340.
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point of law) and section 67161(Challenging the award: substantive jurisdiction) of the English
Arbitration Act 1996. The arbitral tribunal had issued a "Partial Award on Preliminary Issue", the
issue being the substantive law applicable to the merits. The arbitrators could not agree on the
substantive law to be used. The majority of the arbitrators supported the application of the law of
Iowa (USA), whereas the dissenting arbitrator in his dissenting opinion came to the conclusion
that, under English conflict of law rules, English law applied to the substantive issues. In first
instance, Cresswell, J, allowed the appeal from the tribunal because he agreed with the dissenting
arbitrators analysis and even directly referenced it in his decision. The successful party in the
arbitration proceedings attacked that ruling and requested permission to appeal the High Court's
decision. The Court of Appeal rejected this request and, thus, effectively upheld the decision
rendered by Cresswell, J. In summary, the view expressed by the dissenting arbitrator, in the
dissenting opinion had a direct effect on the reversal of the majority's decision on the applicable
law since the dissenting opinion was not only referenced in Judge Cresswell's ruling but also
adopted in the decision.162
The second is F v M163 where the High Court had to address a request by the claimant to remit
parts of an ICC award in a construction case to the arbitral tribunal. The request was based on the
reasoning expressed in a dissenting opinion which claimed a serious irregularity under Section
68(2) (a)164 of the English Arbitration Act 1996. The issue was with respect to a head of
damages, which the claimant was entitled to claim according to the arbitral award. The majority
applied a discount of approximately one million euros to respondent's obligation. The reason
given by the majority for this discount was an unpaid balance in respondent's favour that had
160 Section 69, Arbitration Act 1996 (United Kingdom), “Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party to arbitral
proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) appeal to the court on a question of law arising
out of an award made in the proceedings.”
161 Section 67, Arbitration Act 1996 (United Kingdom), “A party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the
other parties and to the tribunal)apply to the court—
a) challenging any award of the arbitral tribunal as to its substantive jurisdiction; or
b) for an order declaring an award made by the tribunal on the merits to be of no effect, in whole or in part,
because the tribunal did not have substantive jurisdiction.
162 Schroeder H and Pfitzner T, ‘Recent Trends Regarding Dissenting Opinions In International Commercial
Arbitration’, 140.
163 F vM [2009] EWHC 275 (TCC).
164 Section 68(2)(a), Arbitration Act 1996 (United Kingdom) , “Serious irregularity means an irregularity of one or
more of the following kinds which the court considers has caused or will cause substantial injustice to the
applicant…”
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presumably arisen under the different agreements between the parties. The dissenting opinion
pointed out that the claimant never owed that sum to the respondent "as a matter of fact".
Coulsson, J, found that the dissenting arbitrator was correct in there was no basis for this unpaid
balance. Commenting on the weight to attach to a dissenting opinion in such a case he stated that,
“A comment or observation in a dissenting opinion, to the effect that an
important point has been decided by the majority without reference to the parties,
will be a factor to which the court will attach weight in dealing with an
application under section 68. Depending on the circumstances, such an
observation may have considerable weight, although it is unlikely that it could, on
its own, prove determinative.”165
Judge Coulson reviewed the merits of the dispute in their entirety by taking into account the
position of the dissenting arbitrator.
The third case is the English case of B v A166 where the High Court had to decide an appeal
against an award rendered by an arbitral tribunal seated in London. On the basis of this
dissenting opinion, B challenged the award, alleging that a serious irregularity under Section 68
of the English Arbitration Act 1996 had occurred. B argued that the majority had not applied the
law chosen by the parties. In his opinion, Tomlinson, J, first quoted the precedent of F v M and
confirmed that a dissenting opinion could be evidence of procedural unfairness to one of the
parties, although it was not formally part of the award.167
The fourth and most recent is a Kenyan case, Kundan Singh Construction v Tanzania National
Roads Agency.168 The high court had to decide whether or not the arbitral award should be
recognized and enforced as a decree of the Court. The arbitration proceedings were conducted by
a panel of three Arbitrators, with two arbitrators rendering a majority award and one arbitrator
dissenting. The applicant’s case was that the application should be allowed since they had
furnished the Court with the necessary documents required under section 36(2) of the Arbitration
165 F vM [2009] EWHC 275 (TCC), para.16.
166 B vA [2010] EWHC 1626.
167 B vA [2010] EWHC 1626,para.21, Tomlin J, “might be admissible as evidence in relation to procedural matters,
as where for example it is alleged that some aspect of the procedures adopted in the arbitration worked unfairly to
the disadvantage of one party.”
168 Kundan Singh Construction (Kundan) v. Tanzania National Roads Agency (the Agency) [2013] eKLR
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Act. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the award could not be recognized or
enforced because the majority arbitrators went beyond their scope and decided on matters
beyond the scope of reference to arbitration. Furthermore, they argued that the majority decision
completely ignored to apply the Tanzanian legislation which was the law governing the contract.
The respondents were relying on Section 37 of the Arbitration Act which provides grounds for
non-enforcement. Therefore, the main issue for determination by the court is whether the
applicant had satisfied the Court that it had met the conditions stipulated in the arbitration Act for
the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award or whether the Respondent had placed before the
Court a case for refusal or rejection of the enforcement and recognition. The essence of the
Respondents case is that the majority Award was arrived at by wrongly applying English Law
and not Tanzanian Law as specifically provided in the contract. Muya J, agreeing with the
dissenting opinion held that the decision of the majority as set out in the award was made
contrary to the laws of Tanzania169 and that the court could not condone such a breach.
Therefore, it would be contrary to public policy to enforce such an award.
To summarize, the cases above have illustrated how beneficial dissenting opinions have been to
courts and parties as evidence in proceedings challenging arbitral awards. Such proceedings are
important since they ensure that awards that are unjust or against public policy are not enforced
or recognized.
4.3 Challenges Posed by Dissenting Opinions in Domestic Arbitration
4.3.1 Dissenting opinions risk violating the secrecy of deliberations
Dissents in arbitral awards risk disclosing the secrecy of deliberations.170 Although not expressly
codified in the law, confidentiality in deliberations is applied as a matter of practice. As an
169 Kundan Singh Construction (Kundan) v. Tanzania National Roads Agency (the Agency) [2013] eKLR, Muya J, “I
have perused the material on the Tanzanian law as relates to the case at hand and I am of the considered view (as
that held by the Respondents) that had the majority two considered the provisions of the public procurement (works)
Regulation 2005, first regulation 123 (1) and then regulation 123 (2) as was done by Mrs. Ufot SAN in her
dissenting opinion then they too would have come to the same holding as she did. Instead as alleged in paragraphs
300 to 302 of the majority award, the majority two offered an interpretation of regulation 123(2) which was not in
tandem with the scheme of the said regulations. This resulted in a wrong finding, unlike Mrs Ufot san that the
Engineer was not an agent of the Employer. That had the majority two read the provisions of regulation 123(2) in
the context of the management of the works, they would have most certainly have reached the conclusion that the
Engineer was indeed the agent of the procuring entity on the other hand Mrs. Ufot in her dissenting opinion at
paragraphs 5.35 to 5.37 correctly held that the Engineer is the agent of the procuring entity.”, 10.
170 Mosk and Ginsburg, ‘Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration’, 274.
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example of this the Chartered Institute of arbitrator Kenya Branch Rules provide that an
arbitrator’s note remain confidential to preserve the integrity and confidentiality of
proceedings.171 The secrecy of deliberations should be maintained so as to enable members of
the tribunal to freely exchange their views and arguments. Dissenting opinions may reveal the
discussions that took place between the arbitrators as the dissenting arbitrator attempts to counter
the views of the majority. Such revelations may be contrary to the wishes of the majority of the
arbitrators. Furthermore, it runs the risk of a party appointed arbitrator being questioned by the
appointing party on certain deliberations that were adverse to the party’s interests.172 To prevent
this it is essential that the dissenting arbitrator limit their reasons for not signing to alternative
views of the facts and law, and ought not to discuss the substance of deliberations between the
arbitrators.173
4.3.2 Dissents increase the likelihood that awards will be challenged
Dissenting opinions may encourage the unsuccessful party to challenge the award. Finality in
arbitration ensures procedural neutrality, certainty, confidentiality and efficiency in dispute
resolution all of which are compromised if the winner must re-litigate the case in a public
forum.174 Jurisprudence exists to support the view that dissenting opinions do have persuasive
power in the courts when challenging awards and their enforcement. Dissenting opinions can
therefore motivate unsuccessful parties to challenge awards based on the alternative views
expressed by the dissenting arbitrator. This compromises the binding nature of arbitral awards
contemplated in section 32A of the arbitration act.
As stated before, arbitrators should never render dissenting opinions for with the intention of
frustrating the enforcement of an award or attracting a challenge to the award. It is a legitimate
concern but it should not be used to restrict the benefits provided by dissenting opinions. If a
dissenting opinion does lead to non-enforcement of an award on legitimate grounds, then it has
served a useful purpose by preventing an unjust award.175 Brower and Rosenberg, however,
directly challenge the contention, rightfully noting that "Unjust arbitral awards based on manifest
171 Rule 10, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (Kenya Branch) Arbitration rules.
172 Baker S and Davis M, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules In Practice, 1ed, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers,
The Hague 1992, 157.
173 Mosk and Ginsburg, ‘Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration’, 274.
174 Park W W, ‘Why Courts Review Arbitral Awards’, Festschrift für Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, (2001), 595-606596.
175 Mosk and Ginsburg, ‘Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration’, 274.
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violations of the parties' procedural rights, for example, deserve no such protection from
annulment or non-enforcement.”176
4.3.3 The worrying nexus between party appointed arbitrators and dissenting
opinions
Party Autonomy is an essential characteristic of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. One
way parties may exercise this autonomy is by appointing arbitrators to the tribunal. Section 12 of
the Arbitration Act envisions a tribunal with either three or two arbitrators, or a sole arbitrator.
Where there is tribunal consisting of three arbitrators, each of the parties shall select an arbitrator
and the two arbitrators shall select the third member of the tribunal who shall be the umpire. One
of the arguments made against dissenting opinions in multipartite tribunals is Dissenting
opinions may threaten the independence of the party-appointed co-arbitrators who might feel
obliged to dissent out of loyalty to the party who had appointed them.177
It is worrying that non neutral arbitrators could potentially use dissenting opinions to prove
fidelity to the party that appointed them. Party-appointed arbitrators offer assurance to the parties
that the third arbitrator “fully understands the issues and background of the case, the contentions
of each party, and the possible implications of the award before it is issued.”178 In some sense,
party-appointed arbitrators can be viewed as playing a dual role, where they serve as both judge
and advocate.179 Therefore, is not entirely surprising that they would issue favorable opinions to
the party appointing, since they tend to see the facts similar to their appointing parties. Though
the possibility exists of such misuse of dissenting opinions, Christoph Stippl and Veit Öhlberger
suggest that the “pressure on arbitrators to inappropriately support their nominating party
obviously is quite low.”180
176 Brower. C.N and Rosenberg C.B, ‘The Death Of The Two-headed Nightingale: Why The Paulsson-Van Den
Berg Presumption That Party-Appointed Arbitrators Are Untrustworthy Is Wrongheaded’, 43.
177 Alan Redfern, “The 2003 Freshfields - Lecture Dissenting Opinions in International Commercial Arbitration: The
Good, the Bad and the Ugly”, 232.
178 Rau S A, ‘Integrity in Private Judging’, 38 South Texas Law Review, (1997), 485-529,498.
179Stone s and Won J, “Arbitrator Impartiality in the Context of a Tripartite Tribunal”,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2013_corporate_counselcleseminar/
9_2_arbitration_impartiality_in_context.authcheckdam.pdf , on 8 December 2016.
180 Öhlberger V and Stippl C, ‘Rendering of the Award by Multipartite Arbitral Tribunals, How to Overcome Lack
of Unanimity?’, Austrian Arbitration Yearbook 2008, (2008).
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has considered arguments for and against dissenting opinions in domestic
arbitration. The potential benefits of embracing dissenting opinions include; dissenting opinions
can improve the quality of arbitration by ensuring the production of better awards, they may aid
challenging parties and appellate bodies during judicial review of awards and finally they ensure
maintenance of intellectual integrity on the part of the arbitrators. The risks posed by embracing
dissenting opinions include violation of the confidentiality of deliberations; they increase the




Conclusion, Findings and Recommendations
5.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to present the findings of the study and propose recommendations on how to
address the challenges presented by dissenting opinions can be addressed. Finally this chapter
will conclude the study by reflecting on the objectives, the statement of the problem and the
hypothesis and discern if each has been addressed.
5.2 Findings
Through careful consideration adjudicatory bodies should essentially arrive at an objectively
sound conclusion. In some cases owing to their complexity of some the members of adjudicatory
bodies may not reach similar conclusions. This disagreement in conclusions is expressed by
means of dissenting opinions. In a judicial system which relies on prior jurisprudence, these
dissenting opinions may inform future adjudicators and are often cited as a means of developing
the law. Arbitration cannot accrue such a benefit from dissenting opinions since there is no
system of precedent due to the confidential nature of its proceedings and the fact that awards are
hardly published. The value of dissenting opinions to the arbitration process is less obvious,
which might explain the general reluctance to expressly recognise them in most arbitration
statutes and rules. There is a lack of consensus on whether they should be encouraged or
discouraged resulting in statutory provisions that do not give any guidance as to their legal status
or effect. The courts in the jurisdictions analysed are in consensus, stating that dissenting
opinions are not part of the award but this should not preclude an arbitrator who wishes dissent
as long this right has not been excluded by the agreement of the parties.181 The most common
means by which an arbitrator may issue his dissent is by omitting his signature from the awards
and then subsequently justifying the omission.182 These reasons may be appended to the award if
the majority of the tribunal agrees.183
181 See Chapter Three.
182 See Chapter Two and Three.
183 See Chapter Three.
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Notwithstanding the lack of legal status and express recognition, this paper contends that the
process of arbitration can still accrue some benefits from dissenting opinions.184 Dissenting
opinions may help produce better awards by since the majority will address the issues raised by
the dissenting opinions resulting in a comprehensive and refined award. Dissenting opinions may
also help parties come up with better arguments when challenging awards and also provide
insight to the appellate body when addressing the challenge. Furthermore, dissenting opinions
allow an arbitrator to maintain their intellectual integrity where they disagree with the majority;
dissenting opinions give them an option of non-conformity. The risks often cited with dissenting
opinions in arbitration include185; violation of the confidentiality of deliberations; they increase
the likelihood of the award being challenged and they may be used by arbitrators to appease their
appointing parties. Although the arguments against dissenting opinions raise legitimate concerns,
many of these can be dealt with through codes of ethics or other such mechanisms, and need not
lead to a blanket prohibition of all dissenting opinions.186
5.3 Recommendations
For dissenting opinions in arbitral awards to be embraced the challenges they pose must first be
addressed. First, is the potential misuse of dissenting opinions by party-appointed arbitrators to
appease their appointing parties. Mosk and Ginsburg suggest that a comprehensive code of ethics
could offset such unwarranted behaviour.187 In the words of Laurent Levy: “It is preferable to
eliminate or penalize abuses rather than the means, otherwise useful, which are used to commit
them.”188 Kenya should take a step to come up with such a code of ethics that delineates the
obligations of party appointed arbitrators. Obligations binding party appointed arbitrators to
neutrality may discourage the arbitrators from misusing dissenting opinions.
A code of ethics might also address the risk that dissenting opinions may violate the secrecy of
deliberations. Dissenting opinions should be limited to the points of law and should not in any
way reveal the particulars of the deliberation process. The American Association of Arbitrators
has addressed this concern in its Code of Ethics and Procedural Standards for Labour-
184 See Chapter Four.
185 See Chapter Four.
186 Mosk and Ginsburg, ‘Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration’, 30.
187 Mosk and Ginsburg, ‘Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration’, 30.
188 Laurent Levy, ‘Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration in Switzerland’, 5 Arbitration International, ,
(2014), 35-42,41.
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Management Arbitration. The code of ethics provide that dissenting opinions should be based on
the arbitrators' views on the evidence and legal principles, and not on the deliberations which
took place between the sessions of the tribunal.189
The fact that dissenting opinions increase the likelihood of challenging the award is a major
concern for many opponents.190 There are no guarantees that can be made that losing parties will
not be motivated by dissenting opinions to support their challenges. The solution to this would be
a blanket ban on dissenting opinions which would be undesirable and would still not guarantee
that the losing party will not challenge the award. The best solution to this is that a dissenting
arbitrator should submit their dissenting opinions to the majority before communicating it to the
parties. The majority should then consider the arguments in the dissent. This will help the
majority refine their arguments and produce a conclusive and comprehensive award that is more
immune to challenge.
5.4 Conclusion
The study sought out to achieve the following objectives; first, to highlight the potential benefits
of dissenting opinions in arbitral awards in arbitration. This objective was achieved in chapter
four which highlighted potential benefits such as producing better arbitral awards; they are
helpful to parties and appellate courts in judicial review of awards and finally they allow an
arbitrator to maintain their intellectual integrity. Second, to analyse the legal framework of
arbitration in Kenya focusing on dissenting opinions in arbitral awards, this objective was met in
chapter two which analysed the provisions within statute that allow an arbitrator to dissent. The
third objective was to look into how other jurisdictions deal with dissenting opinions in arbitral
awards. This objective was achieved in chapter three where a comparative analysis of English,
Swiss, ICC and ICSID arbitration was done. The fourth objective of the study was to propose
recommendations on how to deal with dissenting opinions in arbitration which was done in
chapter five. The study recommends a comprehensive code of ethics.
189 Article 8, American Association of Arbitrators Code of Ethics and Procedural Standards for Labour-Management
Arbitration.
190Poudret J, Basson S, Berti, S and Ponti A, Comparative law of international arbitration, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007
678.
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The problem the study sought to address was whether dissenting opinions in arbitral awards
could provide any potential benefits. The benefits highlighted benefits include; producing better
awards, aiding parties and appellate courts during judicial review of awards and finally allowing
arbitrators to maintain their intellectual integrity. Having accentuated these potential benefits the
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